In re

Defendant.

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

SACRAMENTO DIVISION

In re) Case No. 08-26680-A-7
THEODORE E. HONKANEN and MARCELLA J. HONKANEN,)))
Debtor.)))
SUSAN J. ARCHER,	,) Adv. No. 08-2469))
Plaintiff,))
vs.	,
MARCELLA J. HONKANEN,))

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Susan Archer's complaint asserts that her claim against defendant Marcella Honkanen is made nondischargeable by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). This court agrees because another court previously determined that the defendant owed the plaintiff a

Actually, the plaintiff is now the chapter 7 trustee of Ms. Archer, J. Michael Hopper. Ms. Archer filed her own chapter 7 petition, Case No. 09-28930. The court permitted Mr. Hopper to intervene prior to trial.



fiduciary duty and her intentional breach of that duty injured the plaintiff. The resulting damages are nondischargeable.

The defendant acted as the plaintiff's real estate broker in a pre-petition transaction. In that transaction, the plaintiff attempted to purchase real property from a third party. The defendant represented the plaintiff in that transaction.

When the transaction was not consummated, the plaintiff filed suit against the defendant in state court. The state court suit accused the defendant of performing her duties negligently and of an intentional breach of her fiduciary duty. This alleged breach consisted of making intentional misrepresentations to the plaintiff concerning a real estate purchase agreement and the sufficiency of the plaintiff's performance under it, in addition to failing to disclose the inadequacy of the her performance.

The plaintiff further accused the defendant of breaching her fiduciary duty of loyalty by acting in the interests of the seller rather than in the plaintiff's interest. This was done by falsely informing the seller that the plaintiff could not satisfy the financing requirements for the purchase and was in breach of the sale agreement.

The state court lawsuit resulted in a jury verdict awarding damages to the plaintiff. The jury's special verdict concluded that the plaintiff's total damages were \$356,000. Even though the jury apportioned negligence between the parties, finding the defendant 70% at fault and the plaintiff 30% at fault, it awarded the plaintiff 100% of her damages. This apparent inconsistency in the verdict is explained by the fact that the jury also concluded that defendant had breached her fiduciary duty to the

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plaintiff when she made the intentional misrepresentations and breached her duty of loyalty. This is clear from the jury's special verdict which awarded the plaintiff her entire \$356,000 loss, not just 70% of it.

Section 523(a)(4) provides that an individual is not discharged "from any debt for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny."

The fiduciary capacity requirement applies only to debts for fraud or defalcation. Embezzlement and larceny do not require the existence of a fiduciary relationship. See Cal-Micro, Inc. v. Cantrell (In re Cantrell), 329 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lewis v. Scott (In re Lewis), 97 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1996); Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Littleton (In re Littleton), 942 F.2d 551, 555 (9th Cir. 1991).

Only two questions exist under section 523(a)(4) when fraud or defalcation are involved: whether the defendant committed fraud or defalcation and whether it was committed in relation to the debtor's fiduciary responsibilities. <u>Bugna v. McArthur (In re Bugna)</u>, 33 F.3d 1054, 1057 (9th Cir. 1994).

The definition of fiduciary capacity under section 523(a)(4) is a question of federal law. <u>Cantrell</u>, 329 F.3d at 1125. The state law does not control the definition of fiduciary. <u>Id.</u> The fiduciary relationship must arise from an express or technical trust that was imposed before and without reference to the wrongdoing that caused the damage to the plaintiff. <u>Id.</u> (citing <u>Lewis</u>, 97 F.3d at 1185). Courts rely on state law only to ascertain whether the required trust relationship exists.

<u>Cantrell</u>, 329 F.3d at 1125. Thus, the defendant was not a

fiduciary merely because the state court concluded that she was a fiduciary.

The Ninth Circuit has held that the fiduciary duty a real estate broker owes her client under California law makes the broker a fiduciary for purposes of section 523(a)(4). Bugna, 33 F.3d at 1057 (citing Woosley v. Edwards (In re Woosley), 117 B.R. 524, 529 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990)). There is no dispute in this case that the defendant served as a real estate broker for the plaintiff. Hence, in this case the defendant was the plaintiff's fiduciary.

For purposes of section 523(a)(4), defalcation is defined as the misappropriation of trust funds or money held in any fiduciary capacity. <u>Lewis</u>, 97 F.3d at 1186. Here, the plaintiff is not alleging a defalcation by the defendant.

Under section 523(a)(4), a fiduciary who commits an actual fraud may not discharge the resulting liability. See Roussos v. Michaelides (In re Roussos), 251 B.R. 86, 94 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000); see also Bell v. Berry (In re Berry), 174 B.R. 449, 453 (Bankr. N.D. Tex 1994). To prove actual fraud, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a misrepresentation, concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact; (2) made intentionally by the defendant; (3) with the intent and purpose to deceive the plaintiff; (4) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (5) a resulting injury. Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal. App. 2d 123, 128 (1966).

The complaint alleges that the "[d]efendant . . . assured [p]laintiff that her tender of performance was adequate."

"Plaintiff was advised by [d]efendant . . . that her tender of

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These items satisfied her requirements under the contract."

"Said representation was intentionally false." Complaint ¶ 7.

"Defendant . . . intentionally concealed the seller's objections from [p]laintiff, denying her the opportunity to cure the defaults." Complaint ¶ 8. "Such statements . . . were made with the intent to induce the [p]laintiff to breach the 2004

[c]ontracts and induce seller to cancel the [c]ontracts, all to [p]laintiff's direct detriment." Complaint ¶ 10. The complaint also refers to harm sustained by the plaintiff in the amount of \$356,000, resulting from the defendant's actions. Complaint ¶ 15. These allegations mirror allegations appearing in the state court complaint. See Trial Exhibit 2, ¶ 7-15.

By virtue of these allegations, the plaintiff is asserting that the defendant committed actual fraud in connection with her duties as the plaintiff's real estate broker. They state a claim for fiduciary fraud.

The plaintiff proved these allegations in state court. As noted above, the jury found for the plaintiff on both her negligence and intentional breach of fiduciary duty claims. Having actually litigated the existence of a fiduciary duty and the breach of that duty by making intentional misrepresentations, the doctrine of issue preclusion prevents the defendant from relitigating these issues. See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991). California law is in accord. See Gayden v. Nourbakhsh (In re Nourbakhsh), 67 F.3d 798, 800 (9th Cir. 1995); Harmon v. Kobrin (In re Harmon), 250 F.3d 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2001). Even assuming issue preclusion did not prevent relitigation of the issues, the defendant offered no exculpatory

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evidence.

Therefore, the judgment of the state court is made nondischargeable by section 523(a)(4). Counsel for the plaintiff shall lodge a conforming order.

Dated: November 24, 2009

By the Court

Michael S. McManus, Judge

United States Bankruptcy Court

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

The undersigned deputy clerk in the office of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of California hereby certifies that a copy of the document to which this certificate is attached was served by mail to the following entities listed at the address(es) shown below.

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DATED.

MAR 1 0 2010

By:

Deputy Clerk

Sarah Head